We Learned Nothing From Robodebt: Schedule 2 and the Royal Commission Deadline You Haven’t Heard About
Twenty-eight months ago, the Robodebt Royal Commission delivered a scathing verdict: automated government decision-making without proper safeguards is incompatible with the rule of law. The scheme that unlawfully raised debts against 443,000 Australians was fundamentally flawed by design.
In January 2026, Parliament passed Schedule 2 of the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Firearms and Customs Laws) Act 2026.
It replicates Robodebt’s structure.
This Friday, 13 March, is the deadline for submissions to the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion’s preliminary report on urgent measures. Almost no one is talking about Schedule 2. They should be.
What is Schedule 2?
Schedule 2 introduced sections 92E-92G into the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). These provisions authorise:
- Algorithmic intelligence assessment determining security outcomes (s 92E)
- Ministerial expansion of scope without returning to Parliament (s 92F)
- Statutory immunity from invalidity even when safeguards aren’t followed (s 92G(3))
The legislation passed in response to the Bondi Beach terrorist attack, with the stated purpose of streamlining firearms licensing checks. But the statutory language isn’t limited to firearms.
The Five Fatal Features
The Robodebt Royal Commission identified structural features that enabled widespread unlawful harm despite officials believing they were implementing lawful policy. Compare:
| Feature | Robodebt | Schedule 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Automated harm | Income averaging algorithm | Algorithmic security assessment |
| No notification | Methodology concealed | Notification requirement deleted (s 36(1)(d) repealed) |
| Limited review | Debt assumed valid | Immunity from invalidity (s 92G(3)) |
| Opacity | “Commercial in confidence” | Classified intelligence + proprietary systems |
| Immunity claims | Claimed, later rejected | Enacted in statute |
That last point is critical. Robodebt’s immunity was eventually struck down by courts. Schedule 2’s immunity is written into law.
What Parliament Wasn’t Told
Here’s where it gets interesting.
The Explanatory Memorandum for the same legislation explicitly references the Robodebt Royal Commission when discussing ACIC (criminal intelligence) automation:
“The clauses in this Division are based on the Government’s response to recommendation 17.1 of the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme Report and the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Automated Decision-making Better Practice Guide.”
For ASIO automation (sections 92E-92G)?
- ✗ No reference to Robodebt
- ✗ No reference to Recommendation 17.1
- ✗ No reference to the Ombudsman’s Guide
- ✗ No explanation why Robodebt safeguards apply to one but not the other
Statistical analysis of 159 pages of Hansard:
- “Robodebt”: 1 mention (Senator McDonald)
- “AI/automation”: 1 mention (same senator)
- “Algorithm”: 0 mentions
- “Section 92E/92F/92G”: 0 mentions
- “Immunity from invalidity”: 0 mentions
One senator identified the parallel. No further discussion occurred.
Why This Matters: The Political Sustainability Problem
The legislation was passed to protect Jewish Australians after a horrific terrorist attack. That purpose was genuine and important.
But here’s the uncomfortable question: What happens when different people control these tools?
Australia’s offshore detention regime offers a case study. Created by a Coalition government in 2001 during the Tampa crisis, briefly dismantled by Labor in 2008, then re-established by Labor in 2012 and expanded by subsequent Coalition governments. The tool persisted across 24 years and multiple governments with very different ideological commitments.
Tools created in crisis don’t expire when the crisis ends. They become permanent infrastructure.
Schedule 2 creates algorithmic assessment capabilities that will be available to:
- Future governments of unknown composition
- Governments facing different threat environments
- Governments with different views on who constitutes a “security risk”
Far-right elements are demonstrating at state parliament buildings with Nazi symbols. Political parties with records of targeting minority communities are polling at levels that could translate to parliamentary representation.
Should tools capable of population-wide profiling based on ancestry exist, even if the current government has no intention to misuse them?
The 2026 Census Timing Problem
In August 2026, Australia conducts its national Census. Question 23 asks: “What is the person’s ancestry?” (up to two responses).
In 2021, 99,956 Australians identified “Jewish” ancestry.
The same database that could theoretically help with firearms licensing could theoretically assess anyone whose Census data indicates particular ancestry, religion, or national origin.
Sections 92E-92G + ministerial instruments + Census data = infrastructure for population-wide algorithmic profiling.
August 2026 is five months away. That’s a very limited window for democratic course correction.
What You Can Do
The Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion is accepting submissions until Friday, 13 March 2026 for inclusion in their preliminary report on urgent measures.
The Commission’s Terms of Reference ask: “What more should be done to protect the Jewish community and promote social cohesion?”
One answer: Don’t create institutional tools that could be weaponized against the communities they were designed to protect.
I’ve made a detailed submission examining these issues ([available here – link to PDF]). Key recommendations include:
- Suspend sections 92E-92G before operational deployment
- Refer to IGIS, Ombudsman, and NACC for investigation
- Apply Robodebt safeguards if automation framework is retained
- Protect 2026 Census data from algorithmic profiling
But you don’t need to submit 198 pages. A brief submission identifying your concerns about:
- The Robodebt parallel
- The lack of parliamentary scrutiny
- The Census data protection question
- The political sustainability problem
…would contribute to the Commission’s consideration of urgent measures.
Submission portal: [Royal Commission website]
Deadline: Friday, 13 March 2026
The Robodebt Lesson
The Robodebt Royal Commission found that well-intentioned people implementing what they believed was lawful policy created a system that caused widespread unlawful harm.
The lesson wasn’t “don’t automate.” The lesson was “if you automate, do it with proper safeguards.”
Twenty-eight months later, we passed legislation with the same structural flaws Robodebt exposed.
We can either learn from Robodebt before harm occurs, or after.
The Royal Commission has an opportunity to recommend we choose “before.”
Read the full submission: [link]
Royal Commission website: [link]
Make a submission: Deadline Friday, 13 March 2026